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THE EVOLUTION OF THE PRENATAL DUTY
RULE: ANALYSIS BY INHERENT
DETERMINANTS*
James P. Murphy**
I.

INTRODUCTION

Are there inherent determinants that govern basic factual situations and coalesce with them in the directed development of a rule of
law? To put it another way, does a rule of law evolve? If a judge reads

a number of cases with similar facts, a presently existing consciousness

confronts the written material on the pages. By bringing together these

cases, the reader has constellated them into an independent entity, an
entity that can only be described as a kind of being. If this being is
regarded, studied, perused for meaning, does it not likewise regard the
reader? When the reader has completed his analysis, integrated the relevant principles of law, and announced in the form of an opinion his
conclusions, does not this being or entity, in a subtle and quiet way,
simultaneously make known its conclusions and judgments on the
reader? Perhaps what has taken place is a momentary coming together
of distinct beings, one timeless and pure idea, the other finite and
material.
Every lawyer operates on the assumption that there is a significant
element of predictiveness in the development of the law, and that there
may be something approaching accurate knowledge as to the particular
turn the law will take just up ahead. A primary function of the lawyer
as a theorist is to do a thorough, efficient job of marshaling his data
and materials, apply his mind like a fine tool to the problem before
him, and posit the likely course of the law. But the immediacy of his
task and its wholly utilitarian purpose give him no reason to go beyond
the merest edge of the present, a penumbra in fact so fused with the
present that authentic predictive positions may easily be attributed to
hunches, a feel for the times, or common sense. When the lawyer is a
practitioner, he wears near-sighted glasses; he must do so. Yet, in order
to get at the question we pose, even in the most tentative way, we must
be ready to treat the practitioner's methodology, with its concern for
the period that stretches from the immediate present to the immediate
future, to be no more than a special application of a larger general
Copyright James P. Murphy
Associate Professor of Law, University of Bridgeport School of Law; B.A. University of
Maine (1964); LL.B. University of Maine (1969); M.L.S. University of Maine (1972).
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principle. In the exposition of this larger principle, therefore, we ought

to assume the existence of a different world, admittedly imaginary, in
which the lawyer's role and his concern is to arrive at predictive inferences on matters that will culminate, not next week or next year, but,
for example, in fifty years. The question, therefore, is whether the lawyer can, given a concerned interest in that distant time, posit the probable course of the law from presently existing determinants.
At this point there is a temptation to succumb to empiricist ten-

dencies and reply that the probable course of the law over a long period
of time depends mostly upon the trend of conditions during that time

span. Because future conditions are largely unknowable, the question
itself is arguably baseless. It is a truism, of course, that the distant
future cannot be known with anything approaching certitude. Changing conditions, manners, morals, changing needs, real and perceived,
play the central role in the life of the law as well as the life of a people.

The force that conditions exert is ultimately expressed in the formation
of positive, or legislative declaration. It is not so clear, however, that
the path of law, absent positive declaration, would run a parallel

course.
The following statement may be at best an unsatisfactory approximation: we do not wish to observe a phenomenon from an outside vantage point, we wish to get inside the phenomenon itself and look out: to
convert external conditions from affective agents into passing images.
Finally, in asking and seeking an answer to the question of
whether there are inherent determinants in the law, there must be a
recognition that the response to that question, no matter how tentative
and limited, is inextricably linked to the causes that shape the question
and that motivate the questioner. Predictiveness in the law for the
practitioner connotes effectiveness, capacity, and ability to perform his
function. It is a kind of power. The idea of prediction, closely related to
prognostication, forecasting, even prophecy, is too suggestive of dominance for our purposes. We do not wish to predict the future course of
the law; what we want to do is construe its development by taking it
out of the future and, with the help of language, imagining it.
An area peculiarly adapted for an investigation for hypothesized
inherent determinants is that of prenatal torts. In 1940, a constellation
of roughly a dozen reported cases, beginning in 1884, generally had
denied recovery to the child born with an injury inflicted prior to birth.'
Their rule was clear and unequivocal: a man owed no duty of care to
an unborn child. Then, after a 1946 decision allowing recovery, there
occurred what Prosser has called "the most spectacular and abrupt re-

1. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF TORTS 335-36 (4th ed. 1971).
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versal of a well settled rule in the whole history of the law of torts."'
Within a few years the courts of dozens of states announced a new rule
allowing recovery. By 1967 the reversal was complete: Texas, the last
remaining state, had recanted. One is led to infer that Bonbrest v.
Kotz,8 the 1946 decision, must have been seminal indeed to have precipitated such a relatively rapid turnabout. Yet the opinion itself contained nothing new. It was not one of those occasional cases in tort law
that, because of the brilliance and originality of thought of a Cardozo
or a Traynor, become benchmarks. Bonbrest rather capped a process
that had been progressing ever since Holmes' irked surprise in 1884 at
the newfangled idea of prenatal torts.
What were the determinants in this constellation of cases that
made so easy a turnabout from a firm rule of no liability? Were there
elements in this cycle of cases that, while the decisions were saying
over and over again, "no liability," were nevertheless quietly preparing
the way for the establishment of liability? One common aproach to this
kind of question is to bypass it entirely. The approach reduces the question to the aphorism that liability for prenatal injuries was an idea
whose time had come. It is the sociologist's approach; as far as it goes
it is a good approach. But it cannot help the present inquiry unless we
are ready to assume in principle that the law and sociology are opposite
sides of the same coin.
Another problem must be kept in mind: the possibility that it is
fundamentally a misuse of language to speak or even to think in terms
of a rule of law that is enunciated in negatives. From 1890 to 1940 one
might have said with some correctness that there was no recovery for
prenatal injuries. Everyone will agree that all this means is that the
cases had denied recovery. It seems pointless to ask whether the same
rule of law existed in 1880, before its theoretical foundations had been
thought of or even tested. It is, consequently, a minor paradox that a
rule of law denying liability comes into existence as a positive force
because a particular plaintiff sought compensation for what he perceived to be a wrong, and lost. That particular plaintiff is no worse off,
except for his attorney's fee. Ironically, the next similarly situated
plaintiff is worse off. An unfriendly precedent opposes him. It is the
thesis of this article that the inherent determinants and their positive

2.

W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 336 (4th ed. 1971).
3. 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946).
4. [N]o case, so far as we know, has ever decided that, if the infant survived, it could
maintain an action for injuries received by it while in its mother's womb. Yet that is the
test of the principle relied on by the plaintiff, who can hardly avoid contending that a
pretty large field of litigation has been left unexplored until the present moment.
Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 15 (1884).
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force aid him.
II.

THE PRIMAL DETERMINANT

In 1884, a pregnant woman slipped and fell on a public highway.
Miscarriage resulted. The child died within a few minutes of its premature birth. In Dietrich v. Northampton,5 the parents as next of kin took
out administration papers and, under a Massachusetts statute providing
a cause of action for negligent death on the highway, sued the
municipality.
Justice Holmes thought it significant that the suit for prenatal injuries lacked the support of precedent. Accordingly, he suggested that a
burden rested on plaintiffs. That burden required them to reconcile
their suit with the previously unexplored state of this field of litigation.
In Holmes' position an obstacle is raised which has confronted innovating tort claimants from the earliest days down to the present. In a nutshell, the obstacle can be stated as follows: it cannot be done because it
has never been done before. The position locates an inherent determinant in any cycle of cases because it invites refutation by action, similar suits in the future. Judged analytically, of course, the position is
inconclusive; at best it is a standoff. What it boils down to is an absence of precedent either for or against the claimant. Logically, the
burden of explaining why the field of litigation is uncharted-and unmarked by the beacons of precedent-properly belongs no more to
plaintiff than to defendant. Plaintiff, in fact, simply by bringing suit
meets the force of the argument head-on; not by words, but by action.7
The position is the primal determinant in the evolution of a tort
duty. Though its expression indicates an unwillingness to come to grips
with a factual situation on its own merits, the prejudgment of this or
that judge or court is, in the long run, negligible in its influence on an
evolving rule of law. This determinant is like the proverbial foot in the
door. Although the unwillingness mentioned above may be no more
than a culturally conditioned response, its precise origin is not material.
For the time being, it prevents substantive consideration of a new issue.
III.

THE POWER OF MYTH

Holmes, however, did skirt the problem on its merits. How, he
asked, can a person recover for injuries which he received before he
became a person, when he was "part of his mother"?' Today the proposition embedded in this argument seems tendentious in the extreme,
5.
6.
7.
8.

138
See
For
138

Mass. 14 (1884).
Note 4 supra.
the logical reply to the primal determinant, see note 55 infra.
Mass. at 17.
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but it will not do to dismiss it out of hand. For, in nearly every case
following Dietrich, this argument formed the chief stumbling block
against which attempts to recover for prenatal injuries failed again and
again. The proposition was not merely a transparent device designed
and intended to close the subject peremptorily.
According to that proposition, one becomes a person only by altering that state of affairs in which he is a part of his mother. He does so
by becoming separate or apart from his mother, actually departing
from her. Birth is a name we give to the transition from this state of
partness to wholeness. The role of the relational word "part" should be
examined in order to stake out the critical points in the proposition
utilized by Holmes. This use of "part" effectively equates the unborn
with an arm, a leg, or a muscle. A leg cannot sue for injury. An arm
cannot file a complaint. The belly does not bring suit to satisfy its hunger. The harm that these parts suffer is physically original, but their
recovery and vindication for that harm is derivative. To the extent that
the prenatal injury affected the mother, she could recover. A part of
her had sustained injury. But to grant a cause of action to a child injured prior to birth made no more sense than to announce that an arm
or leg had standing to sue. The proposition is epitomized by the symbolism of the Aesopian fable concerning the dispute between the belly
and the other members of the body.'
If we push further into the realm of fantasy, interestingly we encounter points of contact between the pars matris proposition and
mythic assumption. Take the case of Adam's rib. It would be absurd to

suggest that Eve could have recovered for a "prenatal" injury negligently inflicted on Adam's rib. 10 Before its transformation into a
human being, the rib was in the same situation as the Aesopian arm or
leg. Or, take the case of the Greek sculptor Pygmalion who fell in love

with his statuary creation. 1 The gods took pity on him and brought the
statue to life. If an apprentice had carelessly chipped of a piece from
the face of the statue, and the subsquently transformed woman was
9. One fine day it occurred to the Members of the Body that they were doing all the
work and the Belly was having all the food. So they held a meeting, and after a long
discussion, decided to strike work till the Belly consented to take its proper share of the
work. So for a day or two the Hands refused to take the food, the Mouth refused to receive
it, and the Teeth had no work to do. But after a day or two the Members began to find that
they themselves were not in a very active condition: the Hands could hardly move, and the
Mouth was all parched and dry, while the Legs were unable to support the rest. So thus
they found that even the Belly in its dull quiet way was doing necessary work for the Body,
and that all must work together or the Body will go to pieces.
Joseph Jacobs, The Fables of Aesop 72 (London 1894).
10. Genesis 2:21-23.

11.

BULFINCH'S

MYTHOLOGY:
Published by eCommons,
1981
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scarred for life, the proposition would snugly fit the case. Yet, the pars
matris proposition makes unassailable sense only in these archetypal
examples. It is just this exceedingly curious circumstance that suggests
as a determinant the unconscious preference for symbolism and myth
1
over reality, in the face of the novelty of new torts. ' Holmes was not
unaware of the biological reality of prenatal life; indeed, it had been
known and recognized for centuries. The reality, however, was outshone by symbolism and myth.
IV.

INTEGRATION INTO A PRE-EXISTING FRAMEWORK

A few years after Holmes' decision in Dietrich, an Irish case,
Walker v. Great Northern Railway Co.,1' came along. The plaintiff
was born with a deformity due to the defendant railway's negligence in

12. The formal origin of the pars matris proposition was Coke's statement in The Earl of
Bedford's Case, 7 Co. Rep. 7b, 77 Eng. Rep. 421 (K.B. 1586): "And although filius in utero
matris, est pars viscerum matris, yet the law in many cases hath consideration of him in respect
of the apparent expectation of his birth." Id. at 9b. The application of the principle prior to
Dietrich involved only questions of property and inheritance. Although Holmes in Dietrich did not
mention The Earl of Bedford's Case, he did cite the same earlier Yearbook authorities that Coke
had relied on. It became common practice in cases in which a prenatal duty was asserted to return
to Coke's maxim. See, e.g., Walker v. Great Northern Railway, 28 L.R.Ir. 69, 77, 84, 87 (1891);
Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 76 I1. App. 441, 449 (1898), affd., 184 Ill. 359, 56 N.E. 638
(1900); Drobner v. Peters, 232 N.Y. 220, 222, 133 N.E. 567 (1921). Compare Coke's quoted
statement with the following from Drobner: "When justice or convenience requires, the child in
the womb is dealt with as a human being, although physiologically it is a part of the mother." 232
N.Y. at 223, 133 N.E. at 568.
It seems useful to point out that the translation from Latin may have worked a subtle and
unintended denigration of the status of the unborn. First, the English cognates of viscera tend to
relate to intestines. One judge rendered the viscera of the maxim, in fact, as "bowels," a word
which by the late nineteenth century was becoming synonymous with "intestines." Allaire v. St.
Luke's Hospital, 184 Ill. 359, 370, 56 N.Ea. 638, 641 (1900), overruled, Amann v. Faidy, 415 Ill.
422 (1953). The Latin viscera on the other hand had a more generalized, less specific meaning,
probably best approximated in English by the archaic word "innards." Second, and more importantly, the use of the partitive genitive in Latin (viscerum) may well have been intended to convey
an altogether different relational idea than that conveyed to English readers by a statement that
the unborn is "part of its mother." In English "part" means "component." From this position it is
a short step in thought to the proposition formulated by Holmes; vid., a leg cannot bring suit. The
Latin partitive genitive was a grammatical device for showing objective physical relationship in
terms of membership. For example, a soldier is part of an army. The greater whole here is denoted by a collective noun, and there is no insinuation, express or implied, concerning the relative
value or importance of the single member. To say in Latin that an unborn is "part of the innards"
of its mother describes an objective physical relationship, that of pregnancy. It says nothing about
the relative value of the unborn. It is probable, in fact, that the pars matris proposition, as formulated in Dietrich and utilized in subsequent cases, was a legal idea that, even in the form of a
maxim, could not have been intelligibly expressed in Latin without employing other, different
words. The fact that it became convenient in English to drop out the collective noun, viscerum,
might have been a signal of a fundamental misunderstanding of the maxim itself. The words pars
viscerum matris did not contain any support for the value-based idea that Holmes and others
purported to derive from them.
13. 28 L.R.lr. 69 (1891).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss2/3
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carrying plaintiff's mother, who had been a passenger. The mother herself had no difficulty in recovering by way of settlement for her own
physical injury. Like Holmes in America, the four judges, each of
whom delivered a separate opinion, were disturbed by plaintiff's lack of
precedent. They furthermore concurred that at the time of the injury
the plaintiff was part of her mother and therefore had no existence as
such. " '
But Walker went beyond Dietrich in other respects. It abstracted

support for the no-duty rule from the law of carriers. Viewed as a stage
in the evolution of a tort duty, this is an event of some importance. No
purely negative position can long maintain itself without integration
into a solid structure.
According to the law of common carriers, the duty of the railway
to exercise care for the safety of its passengers originates in the relationship of passenger and carrier which the purchase of a ticket initiates. The duty to exercise care for the safety of the passenger exists as

a consequence of the relation defined by the purchase of the ticket. It
arises from contract. Plaintiff's mother, therefore, as a passenger, enjoyed the protection of the law for any negligent injury she might suffer. Not so the unborn child, however. Because the unborn child had no
contract with the railway, defendant owed no duty to the unborn to
exercise care. The ticket was for the transportation of the plaintiff's
mother. It was good for the carriage of one person, not two-or one
and a half. To say nothing of the nicer metaphysical consequences
which flowed from being or not being a part of her mother, the plaintiff
was not a passenger on the train in which her mother sat. The unborn's
existence, already made dangerously contingent by the pars matris pro-

position, ceased altogether when the mother boarded the train. Because

14. Despite the fact that only one of the four judges, Johnson, J., asserted as much directly:
"[T]he plaintiff had no actual existence; was not a human being; and was not a passenger - in
fact, as Lord Coke says, the plaintiff was then pars viscerum matris .... " 28 L.R.Ir. at 88.
Harrison, J.,stated: "[T]he plaintiff was still unborn and had no existence apart from her
mother." Id. at 80. O'Brien, C.J., disctissed but did not resolve the pars matris problem; he chose
instead to place his reason for denying a cause of action on a contractual ground which obviated
consideration of pars matris: "[Hiowever the child in the womb may be regarded, whether as part
of the mother or having a distinct personality - whether an entity or a non-entity - it was, so far as
any actual relation the company had with it, a non-entity." Id. at 79. The Chief Justice's reluctance to use the pars matris argument determinatively, as Holmes had done in Dietrich, probably
resulted in large part from his recognition that the argument proved too much - a circumstance
the force of which was largely lost on American courts for the next several decades. O'Brien
recognized that a defendant who had wilfully inflicted injuries on a pregnant woman would probably be liable in tort to the child who was afterwards born crippled as a result of the injuries. 28
L.R.Ir. at 74. The pars matris proposition seemed blind to such a distinction. A part is a part is a
part.
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she was a non-passenger, she was a nonentity."'
The reasoning by which the unborn child is denominated a nonpassenger and on that basis is found to be not entitled to protection is
noteworthy in two respects. First, it provides a justification to any judge

15. See Chief Justice O'Brien's remarks, note 14 supra; Justice Johnson's remarks, note 14
supra and 28 L.R.Ir. at 88. There was a certain upside-down quality in the mere statement of this
position, as exemplified in the following fanciful dialogue:
Judge A: The question is, was the plaintiff part of her mother at the time of the injury?
Judge B: How could she be? She wasn't even a passenger on the train.
Judge C: Q.E.D.
Since the plaintiff was not a passenger on the train, she could not conceivably be a part of her
mother. In fact, she probably had not been conceived at all..(The episode provides a poignant
example of the dehumanization that accompanies the over-reliance on legal abstractions. But for
every action there is a reaction, and for the unresponsible use of language that made the above
syllogism possible there would be a dialectical price, whose payment would take form in the subliminal irruption of a stark metaphor. See Part IV infra.)
Such ludicrous pseudo-logic was nothing new; it was only a particular application of the old
dogma (which even today has not been quite overthrown) that no duty of care can exist in the
absence of some affirmative undertaking, a contractual relationship, or other special circumstances
giving rise to what is sometimes called "a legally cognizable relation."
Similar applications are legion. Indermaur v. Dames, L.R. I C.P. 274 (1866), aff/d. L.R. 2
C.P. 311 (Exch. 1867), had established the rule that landowners were under a duty to exercise
care in behalf of their business visitors, but in 1880 a four year old boy who accompanied his older
sister on a business visit was not allowed to recover. The duty to his sister, the invitee, did not
extend to him.. Had both of them been injured simultaneously and on the same loose step, the
result for the boy would have been the same. Burchell v. Hickisson, 50 L.J.C.P. 101, 13 Weekly
Notes 166 (1880).
More recent examples of the application of the no-duty dogma are Thompson v. County of
Alameda, 27 Cal. 3d 741, 614 P.2d 728, 167 Cal. Rptr. 70 (1980) (no duty to exercise care in
releasing sexual psychopath with known violent propensities towards young children, even though
person released had indicated beforehand that he would take the life of a child residing in his
neighborhood); Bradshaw v. Railings, 612 F.2d 135 (3d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, sub nom, Borough of Doylestown v. Bradshaw, 446 U.S. 909 (1980) (no duty on university to exercise care by
having advisor present at class picnic even though university was aware that large quantities of
beer would be consumed illegally at this university-sponsored function).
An example directly in point to the subject matter of this paper concerns the thalidomide
disaster. The German drug manufacturers maintained, apparently with some tactical success, that
under German law the malformed plaintiffs had no cause of action because the unborn had no
legal protection, i.e., no duty was owed to them. Even in England there was some considerable
question whether a cause of action existed for the thalidomide babies. The Insight Team of the
Sunday Times, untrained in the niceties of legal abstractionism and pars matris, naively characterized the no-duty defense as "unbelievable." See Suffer the Children: The Story of
Thalidomide, by the Insight Team of the Sunday Times of London (1979), 123, 149.
Although no English decision has considered the question of the existence of a cause of action
for prenatal injuries, and although Walker, coming from a common law court, has been treated
respectfully by commentators in England, the problem has largely been made moot by legislation.
See CHARLESWORTH ON NEGLIGENCE (6th ed. 1977) 126-27; CLERK AND LINDSELL ON TORTS
(14th ed. 1975) 102-03.
It is interesting to note that, after the unfavorable decision in Walker, plaintiff took the case
to the Appeals Court in England, where it was argued at length. The child died, however, before
judgment was given. See BEVANs ON NEGLIGENCE (3rd ed. 1908); Buel v. United Rys. Co. of St.
Louis, 248 Mo. 126, 132, 154 S.W. 71, 72 (1913), overruled, Steggall v. Morris, 363 Mo. 1235,
258 S.W.2d 579 (1953).
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who, because of personal inclination, frowns on the innovative suit. Second, it produces a tension between the pristine dogma embodied in the
no-duty rule and its extended application. This tension tends to lead to
a movement of accommodation of the factual situation, not by the outright rejection of the logic which produced the tension in the first place,
but through a process by which the formerly rejected action is eventually assented to on the basis of its adventitious relation to some primary
action which is already recognized. 6 An example directly pertinent to
the Walker court's use of logic in relation to the process suggested is
found in Austin v. Great Western Railway,17 where the defendant regularly carried free of charge children under the age of three. Carrying
the infant in her arms, the mother bought a ticket for herself and
boarded the train. It turned out of course that the child was over the
age of three and therefore no longer eligible for free passage. Predictably enough, the defense was that no duty of care existed towards the
child, since it was not legitimately present on the train. But here it was
held that the duty of care to the child depended not on contracts or
tickets, but instead on the child's presence on the train. Physically, he
was a passenger. 8

16. For example, the tension produced by the logic utilized in Burchell v. Hickisson, 50
L.J.C.P. 101, 13 Weekly Notes 166 (1880), in which the four year old brother could not recover
for his injury, cries out fundamentally for rejection of the categories, straight and simple. An
accommodation within the dogma of the precise factual situation is a more likely and perhaps a
more desirable result. The purposive argument is made that the status of the younger brother is
tied to, or hooked together, with his sister's. The argument makes sense. After all, the two are
physically in each other's company. Her primary right of protection, which is that of the invitee, is
thus extended to him. In relation to the duty owed, the boy's status becomes pendant on his
invitee-sister's status. See, e.g., Custer v. Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 43 A.2d 716, 717 (D.C.
1945) ("by every consideration of custom and usage and common sense, such invitation extended
to and included the mother's infant child"); Murphy v. Kelly, 15 N.J. 608, 612, 105 A.2d 841,
843 (1954) (six year old child who accompanied father to monumental works an invitee: "[i]t is a
logical and equitable rule in this complex, rapidly moving, modern existence of ours"). But see
Dunleavy v. Constant, 106 N.H. 64, 204 A.2d 236 (1964) (assuming that father was an invitee,
his status did not extend to his six year old child accompanying him to private residence to help
repair automobile). It was this process of extending protection by adventitious relationship that
Cardozo, as judicial conservative, had cautioned against in H.R. Moch Co. v. Rensselaer Water
Co., 247 N.Y. 160, 159 N.E. 896 (1928), when, finding for the defendant, he voiced the fear of
the imposition of a whole series of duties "inescapably hooked together." (247 N.Y. at 168, 159
N.E. at 899). Compare with the earlier expressed fear of "an infinity of actions" in leading noduty cases. Russell v. Men of Devon, 2 T.R. 667, 671, 100 Eng. Rep. 359, 362 (K.B. 1788);
Winterbottom v. Wright, 10 M. & W. 109, 113, 152 Eng. Rep. 402, 404 (Ex. 1842).
17. L.R. 2 Q.B. 442 (1867).
18. His boarding the train, held ostentatiously in his mother's arms, was openly witnessed
by the agents of the railway. The court was not so certain that the result would have been the
same had the mother smuggled him aboard beneath her skirts or obtained his passage by some
other fraudulent means. L.R. 2 Q.B. at 446. The court seems to spread its credulity thin by failing
to reckon with the evident hint of fraud clearly present. Defendant's counsel argued that there was
"a complete identity between [the child] and his mother, and the concealment practiced by her
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The case looks like appropriate authority for plaintiff in Walker.
Children under the age of three who travel on trains are universally in
the custody, if not in the arms of, accompanying grownups. It would
take no great leap in thought to find that a child who boards a train
without a ticket is bound together with his parent or custodian for the
purpose of determining the duty owed to him. If that is so, it is a small
step to extend the analogy to include a pregnant woman and the fetus
within her, who are undoubtedly bound together. Yet it is just at this
point that the Walker court withdraws, for reasons whose roots descend
straight into the philosophy of idealism. How can a duty be raised by
the mere possibility that a woman boarding a train is pregnant? The
judges thought that imposition of a duty on this mere possibility of
pregnancy would amount to a liability too remote and speculative to be
fairly cast upon the railway. Practically, it was what Holmes had previously described as a "conditional prospective liability."' " The old adage, out of sight out of mind, was never truer.2 0

[affected his] claim." Id. at 444.
19. Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 16 (1884).
20. The turn of thought is revealing of the nineteenth century attitude toward pregnancy.
The consequential parallel between the pregnant woman and the woman who sneaks the concealed
infant onto the train without a ticket is unmistakable. In Austin, the court would remind us, the
railway's agents knew of the child's presence. He was right before their eyes. The corollary of this
position, of course, is that a woman whose pregnancy was obvious, or one who flaunted or announced her state, would thereby secure recognition by the law of a duty of care owed to her as
yet unborn infant in its own right. Two of the Walker judges go so far as to acknowledge the
validity of the corollary, had the pleadings asserted notice by the railway of the pregnant condition of the mother. (O'Brien, C.J.: 28 L.R.Ir. at 79; Harrison, I.: Id. at 80). On this head their
decision would have eased the tension produced by the no-duty dogma. Their willingness to find a
duty based on visual notice was of little value, practically. Any woman could be pregnant, in one
stage or another, early or advanced. Appearances are deceptive. A woman might look pregnant
and not be, and vice versa. In the real world, when she boards a train a woman's state is seldom
noticed and rarely announced. The distinction suggested, while interesting as an attempt at easing
tension within the developing rule, would hardly ever palliate the no-duty rule, at least with respect to public conveyances. See also Nugent v. Brooklyn Heights R. Co., 154 A.D. 667, 139
N.Y.S. 367 (1913), affid. per curiam, 209 N.Y. 515, 102 N.E. 1107 (1913):
Had it, born, been carried in its mother's arms, it would have been a gratuitous passenger,
but the carrier's duty towards it would not have been thereby lessened. The learned counsel
for the plaintiff suggests that the duty would attach had the child been concealed in a
garment. Such condition does not usually escape the observation of the carrier's servants
exercising ordinary attention, and the case of the mothers concealing their infants from the
expectable knowledge of carriers might, under some circumstances, excuse some act of the
carrier whereby it was injured. But it is not the duty of a carrier to scrutinize its passengers
for the detection of unborn children, to the end that they, although latent, may be regarded
as passengers.
154 A.D. at 673, 139 N.Y.S. at 371. The association between the act of concealment and the state
of pregnancy is so deep-rooted in these judges' minds that one has reason to suspect that they
would have been shocked at the suggestion of simply attributing constructive knowledge to a railway that a certain number of women who board trains and streetcars must, in the nature of
things, be pregnant, in one stage or another. According to the legal reasoning of these judges, the
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The principal use which the abstractions from the law of common
carriers served was to integrate 'the evolving rule into a larger, preexisting framework. If the integration produced tension, relief would
occur when the specific factual situation tied on to a relatable situation
in which some other person already enjoyed the protection of a rule of
law. This development, in the course of events, would gradually lead to
an accommodation of the prenatal duty. The development is suggested
in Walker. It did not occur because of the part played by philosophical
idealism. That route of development for the evolving new duty of care
was blocked, at least temporarily.
V.

THE REAL COMMON CARRIERS OF UNBORN CHILDREN

One of the Walker judges said something more revealing in its
singularity of meaning than anything discussed in this analysis of the
use of abstractions from the law of common carriers. In its succinctness
and simplicity it tells us more about the attitude in 1890 toward pregnant women, and indeed toward women in general, than dozens of
cases or volumes of sociological lore could do. Because of its imagery
and rhetorical symmetry it hardly requires comment. It is the metaphorical truth of an age. Justice O'Brien concluded his opinion with
this sentence:
In law, in reason, in the common language of mankind, in the dispensations of nature, in the bond of physical union, in the instinct of duty and
solicitude, on which the continuance of the human race depends, a woman is the common carrier of her unborn child, and not a railway
21
company.
A woman is the common carrier of her unborn child. The implications
are manifold. A common carrier is employed in the business of carrying goods or persons for hire; a common carrier carries all persons who
apply for passage, so long as there is room and no reason for refusal. A
woman is a common carrier. She carries for hire. She is employed in
the business of carrying for hire. She carries all who may apply for
passage so long as there is room to do so, and so long as there is no
legal justification for her refusal, such as, presumably, rape. It follows
that she herself is strictly liable, morally at least, to the unborn child
for any injury it receives prior to its birth, whether the injury occurs

railways and their agents must have been artless innocents to whom the very idea of pregnancy
would have been a wonder. One Walker judge actually went so far as to suggest, in fact, that it
would come as a "surprise" to the carrier that he was carrying two.when he thought he was
carrying one, and an even greater "surprise" when he was carrying three, as in the case of twins.
28 L.R.Ir. at 83.
21. 28 L.R.Ir. at 83.
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through her fault or someone else's. The contract for carriage is with
her, and the concomitant duty of care rests with her and no other.
A deliniation of the critical points of this figure thus unmasks a
been
truth which, after each and every layer of legal abstraction has
22 It will
woman.
of
notion
zeitgeist
ultimate
the
as
left
is
peeled away,
not do to accuse Justice O'Brien of crassness or bigotry, though in
modern ears his metaphor rings with insensitivity. O'Brien, in fact,
came closer than his brethren to recognizing the sought after prenatal
duty of care when he acknowledged that, in the abstract at least, he
could think of no reason why the action should not be held to lie. 28 His
opinion abounds with sympathy for the helpless victim.
VI.

HUMANISM

O'Brien's opinion is remarkable for an additional reason. It offers

a taste of that large, in-gathering humanism-traceable to Blackstone
as an agent of change in the law-which has so often animated resentment for and helped by its purely emotional influence in the eventual
overthrow of a rule that is perceived to be oppressive and unfair. Plaintiff's counsel had cited Blackstone for authority that life begins, in the
contemplation of the law,2 4 as soon as an infant is able to stir in its
mother's womb. O'Brien sympathetically agreed that it seemed cruel
and harsh to deny the crippled child a remedy.25
The problem with the juridical use of humanism is that, conceptually, the argument from humanism is inert. It has no logical force.
This very circumstance, however, ensures its persistent effectiveness. Its
emotional efficacy does not diminish but, on the contrary, increases
with repetition. Nagging qualms about the rightness of the denial of
22.

See Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process (1921)

(Lecture IV. The Subcon-

scious Element in the Judicial Process).
23. 28 L.R.Ir. at 81.
24. Id. at 71. "Life is the immediate gift of God, a right inherent by nature in every individual; and it begins in contemplation of law a[s] soon as an infant is able to stir in the mother's
womb." I W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 129. The statement would be frequently adverted to
in the evolution of the prenatal duty rule. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 76 I11.App. 441, 442
(1898), af d., 184 I11.359, 371, 56 N.E. 638, 641 (1900), overruled on other grounds, Amann v.
Faidy, 415 II1. 422, 114 N.E.2d 412 (1953); Drobner v. Peters, 194 A.D. 696, 700, 186 N.Y.S.
278, 281, rev'd, 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921); Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352, 356 (La.
1923); Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. & C. 227, 227-28 (1924); Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App.
2d 629, -, 92 P.2d 678, 680 (1939); Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 140, note 12 (D.D.C.
1946).
25. The pity of it is as novel as the case - that an innocent infant comes into the world
with the ruel seal upon it of another's fault, and has to bear a burden of infirmity and
ignominy throughout the whole passage of life. It is no wonder, therefore, that sympathy
for helpless and undeserved misfortune has led to what is literally a kind of creative boldness in litigation.
28 L.R.Ir. at 81.
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liability, associated as they often are with humanistic motives, generally result sooner or later in a conscience-based gesture, which is an
intermediate determinant in an inchoate rule of law. The gesture usually takes the form of an observation that if new rights are to be created, it is a matter for the legislature and not for the courts. The expression of such thoughts is normally taken to be the classic mark of
judicial conservatism. It is submitted, however, that the expression is
rather a direct product of the judge's humanist bent of mind and his
inability to make use of humanism as a mechanism to reach what he
actually considers a just, if unprecedented, result. The true judicial
conservative would never make such a statement. For him there could
be nothing more self-evident. To him the expression that it is a matter
for the legislature would amount to no more than an absurd
redundancy.
What then is the significance of such a gesture, seemingly inviting
legislative involvement? The verbal expression itself-and O'Brien's remarks constitute as edifying an instance as they do a treat to his eloquence2 --is better understood, in relation to the decision in a case, as
an effect rather than a cause. Its precise literal content is irrelevant. It
is a verbal outcropping of a deeper dissatisfaction. Give a judge like
O'Brien time enough, and he will find or invent the necessary legal
fictions to skirt the rule, to soften it, or to overcome it entirely. The
more judicial carping that this or that is a matter for the legislature not
the courts, the more certain the judicial discovery-in one year, ten
years, or fifty years-that legislative intervention is not, after all, required. The more frequent and forceful this making a point of deferring to the legislature, the clearer the indication of a speedy evolution.
VII.

THE BIRTH OF THE VIABILITY CONCEPT

So far I have attempted to isolate and identify elements, or matrices, that are the basic movant forces of an evolving rule of law. I have
named these elements inherent determinants because they determine
the course of the evolution. They do not, in any sense of the word,
control; they merely define the ongoing development.
2 7 in
In the next case, Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital,
which we

jump from Ireland in 1891 to Illinois in 1898, the mother was present
in the hospital for the purpose of giving birth. Due to an elevator acci26. The law is in some respects a stream that gathers accretions with time from new
relations and conditions. But it is also a landmark that forbids advance on defined rights
and engagements; and if these are to be altered, if new rights and engagements are to be
created, that is the province of legislation and not of decision.
Id. at 82.
27. 76 II1.App. 441 (1898).
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dent occasioned by defendant's negligence, the child was born with
withered limbs on one side. As in Walker, the mother had no difficulty
in getting a settlement for her own injury.
In the child's own suit, however, plaintiff's counsel went straight to
Blackstone's "gift of God" comment for support.2 8 The defendant's
counsel understandably relied on the two best things he had going for
him: Dietrich and Walker. Essentially, the humanism of Blackstone
was going against the jurisprudential momentum of two unfavorable
decisions. Echoing Holmes, the court thought that it was indisputable
that, until it was "severed" 2 9 from its mother at birth, the child was a
part of its mother, with no "distinct and independent" existence.30 The
28. Id. at 442. See note 24 supra.
29. Id. at 450. The use of this verb, meaning to part by violence, is suggestive. For another
instance, see Walker v. Great N. Ry. Co., 28 L.R.Ir. 69, 83 ("unborn children were severed from
the mother by fiction"). See also Magnolia Coca Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan, 124 Tex. 347, 357,
78 S.W. 2d 944, 948 (1935), overruled, Leal v. C.C. Pitts Sand & Gravel, Inc., 419 S.W. 2d 820
(Tex. Sup. Ct. 1967) (child "expelled" from mother).
30. 76 Il1.App. at 477. The court was also bothered by the lack of precedent, especially
since, as O'Brien had expressed it in Walker, "similar instances must have before occurred." Id.
at 449-50 (quoting from 28 L.R.Ir. 69, 81). This concern, grounded in the common knowledge
that deformed births, for whatever reason, had never been infrequent and that some of them must
have been occasioned by someone's fault other than the mother's, was distinct from the argument
based on the lack of precedent, but it provided what was seen as solid empirical support that the
absence of precedent was significant. Holmes showed the same concern when he remarked with
apparent astonishment that "a pretty large field of litigation [had] been left unexplored until
[1884]." Dietrich v. Northampton, 138 Mass. 14, 16 (1884). It was an understandable concern,
and courts often found justification in it for denying a cause of action: Buel v. United Rys. Co.,
248 Mo. 126, 131, 154 S.W. 71, 72 (1913) ("there must have been many occasions in the progress
of society when a basis existed for such a suit if it had been thought to be maintainable"); Lipps v.
Milwaukee Elec. Ry. & Light Co., 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W.916 (1916) ("But few cases of this
kind are found in the reports, though there must have been many occasions for bringing them had
it been generally considered by the legal profession that a cause of action accrues to a child for
injuries received before birth."); Drobner v. Peters, 194 A.D. 696, 711, 186 N.Y.S. 278, 288
(1921) (Clarke, J., dissenting), rev'd., 232 N.Y. 220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921) ("Through all the
centuries of the common law no such action has been sustained. This is conclusive proof to my
mind that such right of action never did and does not now exist."); Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, 4 D.L.R. 337, 345 (1933) ("cases similar to the present one must have arisen many times in
the past, but that no decided case (or at most only one) has been found in which the child's right
of action for prenatal injuries has been maintained"). The latter case, in holding for plaintiff, went
on to connect the paucity phenomenon with the difficulty of proof, a problem which advances in
medical science were rapidly easing in the early twentieth century. Though greater ability to prove
cause and effect must necessarily have been a factor in the final establishment of the prenatal duty
of care, it cannot by itself explain the dearth of cases in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries.
No cases may be found prior to Dietrich in 1884 in which a prenatal duty of care is contendid for. Why? In 1884 railroads had been common for a long time, both in the United States
and in England. The industrial revolution had been in progress for decades. It is certainly worth
noting that prior to the nineteenth century accidental injury was far less frequent than it was later
to become, and this circumstance may provide a partial explanation for the dearth of cases on the
prenatal injuries. But the infrequency of accidental injury cannot provide an explanation as to why
there were no cases in 1850, 1860, 1870, times well subsequent to the inception of nineteenth
century industrial life.
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child was not a person, not a human being, and not a passenger in the
elevator in which the accident had happened. 3 '

The principal explanation must lie in the range of the popular notion of private injustice on
which all tort law is based. Women blamed themselves for their crippled and sickly offspring, and
the place of women in society reinforced their sense of guilt. Religion and society encouraged the
victims of torts along with the downtrodden to find consolation for their plight in an expected
better life to come rather than in unpredecented suits at law.
Such an explanation is supported by the voluminous popular mythic literature by which society held out to women the trancendental ideal of submitting to the fact of premature child death

as the will of God. See, e.g.,

HANS CHRISTIAN ANDERSEN, THE COMPLETE FAIRY TALES AND

(Translated by E.C. Haugaard 1974): The Story of a Mother 360 (embittered mother
learns to accept death of her child when Death explains to her it is God's will); The Dead Child
642 (mother who could not accept untimely death of her four year old discovers in dream that
child's death was God's will); The Cripple 1049 (in discussing the unmet needs of their crippled
child: "The minister said that we are all God's children, but then why do some get everything and
so many almost nothing?" "It is all because of man's fall from grace," replied his wife.). See also
GRIMM'S FAIRY TALES (Edited by Louis & Bryna Untermeyer 1962): The Aged Mother 762
(embittered old woman who lost both her sons in their infancy and who blamed God for the loss
learns in dream that the children would have been hanged as felons had they lived to maturity; on
awakening she falls to her knees and thanks God for taking them in their innocence); The Shroud
776 (mother embittered by death of six year old son learns to accept the loss after child appears in
dream to explain that it is God's will); Eve's Various Children 786 (Eve, presenting her numerous
children to God for the bestowal of his gifts, complains to Him on the unequal treatment He gives
them, making her pretty, beautiful children knights, kings, noblemen, and merchants, and making
her homely children ("a course dirty shabby sooty band") errand boys, scullions, peasants, and
fishermen. God explains to her that "each shall have his own place, so that one shall support the
other, and all shall be fed like the limbs of the body." Accepting this explanation, Eve asks for
forgiveness and invites God to have His divine will with her children).
It might be argued that these fictional accounts must be amplifications of actual social life,
and therefore not to be taken literally, or as providing any reliable evidence of the inculcation by
society of a desired attitude. On the contrary, actual life provides even stronger evidence of the
suggested explanation. Consider the following from NANCY F. CoTT and ELIZABETH H. PLECK, A
STORIES

HERITAGE OF HER OWN: TOWARD A NEW SOCIAL HISTORY OF AMERICAN WOMEN

(1979):

A virtuous women submitted to the will of God. Increase Mather told the story of a
"Person of Quality" whose only son contracted smallpox. She called in the ministers to
pray for him. When they prayed that if by God's will the child should die the mother
would have the strength to submit, she interrupted, crying: "If He will Take him away;
Nay, He shall Tear him away." The child died. Sometime later the mother became pregnant, but when the time for delivery arrived the child would not come and was consequently "Violently Torn from her; so she Died." For the godly woman rebellion was not
worth the risks. She learned to submit to God, meekly acquiescing to the deaths of husband
and children and ultimately to her own as well.
Id. at 63.
It is to the disconsolate Eves of the world, women and men both, that the law owes the prenatal
duty rule. They made possible the evolution of that rule, and they make possible the continuous
development and the never-ending humanization of the law, by rejecting the myth of divine will,
by refusing to let society convert their despair into guilt, and by asserting instead in a court of
law: "I have been wronged, and it didn't have to be."
31. Justice Adams reasoned that if the action could be maintained it followed that a child
could sue its own mother for injuries caused by her negligence while pregnant. Allaire v. St.
Luke's Hospital, 76 Iii. App. 441, 450 (1898). And that was a disturbing thought. The evolving
rule was thus already beginning to reach out towards distant limits, anticipating an extension of
liability which even today, in 1981, would appear radical to some. The same thought has disturbed
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In Allaire, the first dissent appears. Using conventional legal analysis, the nature of which is to reconcile rather than to oppose, Justice
Windes constructed an artificial distinction. He distinguished Dietrich
by the adventitious circumstance that there the mother was only four
or five months pregnant, "and the child too little advanced in fetal life
to survive its premature birth."3 He did not reject the pars matris
proposition; instead, he moderated its rigor by the construction of a
distinction which shortly came to be known, as it has been known since,
as the viability concept. In Allaire, as distinguished from Dietrich, the
pregnancy had nearly come to term; the mother's presence in the hospital was, in fact, for delivery. The injury occurred subsequent to that
point when the child, if born prematurely, could survive on its own. As
Windes expressed it:
The child, when capable of being born alive, is, in my opinion, a distinct
entity, under the common law, and although no decided civil case, so far
as we know, has so held, humanity and enlightened civilization demand
that the common law, as
administered in Illinois in the nineteenth cen38
tury, should so declare.
One notices here, as evidenced by the words "humanity and enlightened civilization," a considerable reliance on humanism in the formacourts that have been presented with the so-called "wrongful life" cause of action. See Curlender
v. Bio-Science Laboratories, 106 Cal. App. 3d 811, -,
165 Cal. Rptr. 477, 488 (1980). The
cognitive process enclosed in the disturbing thought goes like this:
If A, then B;
but B is absurd and impossible;
therefore A cannot be.
In all such cases, we ought to do some hard thinking about whether B is really absurd and impossible or merely sounds so because of its newness. In Curlender, for example, which held that the
"wrongfully born" infant had a cause of action against the physician and laboratory that had
negligently conducted eugenic tests on the infant's parents to determine the possibility of TaySachs disease in their offspring, Justice Jefferson met the "if A then B" argument directly. In
such a case, he said in dictum, there was "no sound public policy which should protect those
parents from being answerable for the pain, suffering, and misery which they have wrought upon
their offspring." Id. at -, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 488. After the Curlender decision, the California
Legislature, disturbed by the dictum of Justice Jefferson that Justice Adams's speculation in Allaire had foreshadowed in 1898, hurried to enact statutory immunity for parents:
"(a) No cause of action arises against a parent of a child based upon the claim that
the child should not have been conceived or, if conceived, should not have been allowed to
have been born alive.
(b) The failure or refusal of a parent to prevent the birth of his or her child shall not
be a defense in any action against a third party, nor shall the failure or refusal be considered in awarding damages in any such action.
(c) As used in this section "conceived" means the fertilization of a human ovum by a
human sperm." California Civil Code, § 43.6 (1981-82 Regular Session, c. 331: approved
Sept. 3, 1981).
32. 76 Ill. App. at 451.
33. Id. at 454.
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tion of Windes' position. That reliance is also evidenced in other sections of his opinion.
There is, however, a basic inconsistency in the Windes rationale.
The viability concept, the artificial distinction by which the pars matris
proposition is moderated and comprised, is fundamentally inconsistent
with the position based in humanism. This is a circumstance of some
importance. In demonstration, assume that a second pregnant woman,
two months pregnant, is on an elevator with plaintiff's mother. The second woman is present in the hospital as an outpatient in relation to her
pregnancy. The same accident occurs. Each woman in due time gives
birth to a child with withered limbs, whose conditions may be traced to
the accident involving the elevator. We have before us, to use the sympathetically toned language of the humanist position, "' two human beings, stamped for life with the cruel product of another's fault. The
consequence of the Windes position is that the second child may not
recover, since the injury occurred prior to its viability, when, in other
words, it was not a human being or a person but part of its mother.3
Minds motivated by humanism cannot reserve their sympathy and
compassion for the first child in our example and deny them to the
second. One effect, then, of the moderation of the pars matris proposition by means of the viability concept is the introduction of a critical
discontinuity. To the extent that humanism is a governing agent in Allaire, its use is unprincipled. This is not to suggest that its use is insincere. The selective application of unprincipled humanism has been, in
fact, a prominent feature of twentieth century jurisprudence. By logical
implication, Windes challenges the pars matris proposition in its en-

34. [T]he law which says to the helpless infant, 'Ifyour injuries were inflicted, however
wrongful, while you were sleeping peacefully in your mother's womb, though pulsating with
life and vigor, or while you were moving forward to the outer world in obedience to nature's law, with a power almost irresistable, though just beyond the light of day, still a part
of your mother, there is no remedy for your wrongs, if you live through them, though
crippled or deformed for life.... . . . is a reproach to civilization.
Id. at 452. Cf note 25 supra (O'Brien's similarly sympathetically toned language in Walker).

35. There is an escape from this consequence, but it depends on the circular argument that
survival in the face of an injury received at any given post-conception, pre-natal stage demonstrates viability. This argument, however, would empty the viability concept of its content; the
word would become a hollow catchword, and the argument would result in a limitation of the
proposed cause of action to those fortunate enough (or, tragically, in many cases, unfortunate
enough) to survive the prenatal injury. Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138 (D.D.C. 1946), the case
that supposedly initiated the rapid turnabout of the prenatal rule, see text accompanying notes 2-3
supra, employed this circular argument as a limitation on liability, thus making more palatable
the "new" rule: "Here, however, we have a viable child - one capable of living outside the womb and which has demonstrated its capacity to survive by surviving." (emphasis in original) 65 F.
Supp. at 140. A variant of the above argument persists as a basis for the denial of wrongful death
actions for the negligent infliction of death on "non-viable" fetuses. See Wallace v. Wallace, N.H.

-,

421 A.2d 134 (1980).
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tirety; then, by means of the viability fiction, he salvages a good half of
it. On appeal, the Illinois Supreme Court adopted the majority opinion
in a per curiam decision.36 Justice Boggs dissented, following the lines
of the previous Windes dissent. His chief contribution was to provide a
37
name for the compromise Windes had constructed.
The Windes-Boggs viability concept must be appreciated in one
respect as an early attempt to apply scientific knowledge, in both its
technical and popular understanding, as to the rational development of a
rule of law. Boggs, in fact, makes a point of referring knowledgeably to
such medical terms as "gestation" and "parturition." 9 Yet, the
Windes-Boggs concept of viability was a strange blend of myth and
science. For there is evidence that the use of the word viable in nineteenth century medical circles related to the condition of just recently
born children, irrespective of whether the birth was timely or premature. This evidence suggests that the word viable described the pres-

36. Allaire v. St. Luke's Hospital, 184 I1. 359, 56 N.E. 638 (1900).
37. Prosser identifies the Boggs' dissent as the start of the movement to liberalize the noduty rule, W. PROSSER, THE LAW OF TORTS 336, n.23 (4th ed. 1971), but Bogg's chief contribution was to borrow the term viability from medical science and apply it to the concept Windes had
fashioned.
38. For example, both judges noted that occasional oddity of a live birth from a mother
whose life has recently been extinguished, that paradox of life out of death that appears to have
exercised a peculiar fascination over the mind of man from ancient times to the present. 76 Il1.
App. at 454; 184 Ill. at 370, 56 N.E. at 641. Windes had wondered whether an injury to one of
the famous Siamese twins, Chang and Eng, would give rise to a cause of action in the other;
whether the first would be prevented from maintaining an action since he was part of his brother.
76 Ill. App. at 453. Rejecting the'idea that in these instances either Chang or Eng would be
considered by the law to be "part of" the other, Windes likened the umbilical cord that connected
the mother and her unborn to the ligament that connected the famous twins. Id.
Chang and Eng Bunker (1811-1874) exerted an unusually forceful influence on the American
public imagination throughout the nineteenth century. See IRVING & AMY WALLACE, THE Two:
THE STORY OF THE ORIGINAL SIAMESE TWINS

(1978). The questions that Windes posed regarding

their predicament were less fanciful than might be supposed. The authors relate the story of
Chang being charged with assault and battery when a spectator shook his hand a little too firmly
and Chang reciprocated by knocking the offender down. The judge who heard the case agreed
that Chang was guilty but saw no alternative to releasing him since to do otherwise would amount
to a false arrest of Eng. Id. at 105. Another incident with interesting legal ramifications occurred
when Chang and Eng bought a single ticket and boarded a train. When the conductor came
around to collect tickets, Eng confessed he did not have one, and the conductor threatened him
with expulsion. At this moment, Chang jumped up and said, "But I do have a ticket, and if you
put me off I'll sue the railroad." The conductor, observing their connecting band, wisely decided
not to eject Eng from the train. Id. at 118. If, before the taking of the ticket, an accident caused
by the railroad's negligence had resulted in injury to both Chang, the "legitimate" passenger, and
Eng, the "fraudulent" passenger, it seems that the latter would not be able to recover. See notes
17-20 and accompanying text supra. An appreciation of the abnormalities in life materially assisted Justice Windes in setting the posture that the law should take with respect to the normal
things in life. Chang and Eng make a later appearance in Bonbrest v. Kotz, 65 F. Supp. 138, 141
n.13 (D.D.C. 1946).
39. 184 Ill. at 370, 56 N.E. at 641.
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ently existing state of health of a child already born, in terms of the

relative probability of its survival.4 If this is so, it follows that there
was not necessarily any medical support for the postulating of a contingent eventful point, a line of demarcation, located somewhere between

conception and birth, as the point of origin of the duty of care. The
serviceability of the viability concept would depend first on the recognition of such an eventful dividing line and, second, investing it with a
transcendental value akin to that of birth or conception. One senses in
the Windes-Boggs rule a longing to return to the methodology of con-

tingencies and conditionality that had determined real property rights
and inheritance interests in former ages. In an ironic way, the concept
thus tended to vindicate Holmes' earlier expressed concern about the
sheer speculativeness of a "conditional prospective liability."'11 Practically, Windes and Boggs had done more than simply make use of scien-

tific knowledge in the development of a rule of law; they had subordinated law to science. Irrespective of its intellectual validity, viability
was then, as it is now, a function of medical technique.'. In effect, the
viability'concept would substitute medical abstraction-manifested by
expert testimony-for what was becoming an unattractive legal
abstraction.

40. See generally Morison, Foetal and Neonatal Pathology (1952); Potter & Adair, Fetal
and Neonatal Death (1949); Note, The Impact of Medical Knowledge on the Law Relating to
PrenatalInjuries, 110 U. PA. L. REV. 554 (1962). Even today medical use of the word viable is
not uniform with respect to whether it is properly applied to the prenatal or neonatal period.
Compare the definitions of viable found in Black's Medical Dictionary (31st ed. 1976) ("a term
applied to a newly born child to signify that he or she is capable of living separately from the
mother") and in Dorland's Illustrated Medical Dictionary (25th ed. 1974) ("capable of living;
especially said of a fetus that has reached such a stage of development that it can live outside the
uterus"). Yet, the latter dictionary also defines the noun viability simply as "ability to live after
birth." See also J.P. Greenhill, Obstetrics 265 (13th ed. 1966): "Viability is the ability to live
after birth." The definitional instability of the word viability was an important consideration in
leading at least one court to discard the viability concept as a limitation preventing wrongful
"prenatal" death actions. Presley v. Newport Hospital, 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976). See
note 42 infra; See also H. W. Fowler, A Dictionary of Modern English Usage (1926), where the
following entry appears under "viable":
A word apt to puzzle an Englishman. Formed in French from vie life, it means capable of
living, and its special application is to newborn children (e.g. in contrast with stillborn),
but there is some tendency to widen its use. ...
41. 138 Mass. at 16.
42. See, e.g., Wallace v. Wallace, 120 N.H. 675, 682, 421 A.2d 134, 139 (1980) (dissenting
opinion of Douglas, J.):
Viability . . . is what medical science in the last century established as the stage of life
when an infant was said to be capable of existence apart from its mother. . . .The trouble
with this as a guidepost is that it turns upon the ever-changing progress in the field of
medical science.
See also Presley v. Newport Hospital, 117 R.I. 177, 365 A.2d 748 (1976) ("viability" concept
discarded as a limitation on prenatal wrongful death actions).
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FROM STREETCARS TO THE DUTY CALCULUS

Neither Windes nor Boggs had had any trouble with the Walker
case. In Allaire, questions about whether the defendant railway knew
or should have known of the existence of the unborn were moot. The
mother was in the hospital precisely with respect to her pregnancy. For
Windes and Boggs, therefore, the mother's protected status automatically extended over her unborn. Walker in fact had, in a sense, pointed
the way to the Allaire facts, as so often happens in the law. Nevertheless, the thinking of the Walker judges with regard to the duty of common carriers to the concealed unborn- was alive and well in the early
twentieth century.
In 1913, a New York court considered Nugent v. Brooklyn
Heights Railway Co.,4 in which a woman eight months pregnant had
been thrown to the ground as she was alighting from a streetcar. Prenatal injuries resulted. Nugent applied the no-duty dogma just as stiffly
as Walker had done.4 If there was a tension between the no-duty rule
and its extended application, this court did not apprehend it; or, if it
did, was not disturbed by it. Simply put, there was no duty because the
plaintiff stood "in no such relation" to the railway as to "earn" this
obligation. 5 It is interesting that before he began his determinative
duty analysis in Nugent, Justice Thomas had devoted the first and
greater part of his opinion to attacking the pars matris nonentity argument. He did so, not on the humanistic and scientific grounds that had
influenced Windes and Boggs in Allaire, but by analogy from the existence accorded to the unborn in the law of inheritance and in the criminal law. He differed with the view that the unborn were not entitled to
a duty of care in tort law:
In my view, justice should not be turned aside and wrongs go without
remedies because of apprehension of what may happen in jurisprudence
if it be decided that an unborn child has some rights of the person."

43. 154 A.D.667, 139 N.Y.S. 367 (1913), affd.per curiam, 209 N.Y. 515, 102 N.E. 1107
(1913).
44. The court shuffled aside an attempt at accommodation, in the way that Walker had
previously done, by linking the protected status of the mother to the unborn. See note 20 supra.
45. 154 A.D. at 672-73, 139 N.Y.S. at 371. Justice Thomas' duty analysis in Nugent is
remarkable as an example of the crystallization of the duty concept into a wonderful methodology
which jurists looked to with the same faith and confidence with which matematicians looked to
their formulas. In Nugent the methodology disclosed a reflexive predisposition to fall back on tight
legal syllogisms. Justice Thomas' use of the figure in which the plaintiff must "earn" a duty of
care is also notable. Apparently the moralistic work-ethic of 1913, which of course applied equally
to children and grown men and women, extended even into the womb. In order to "earn" a duty of
care, the unborn must work his way free of the womb, or at least work to such a point in prenatal
development that he has made himself conspicuous.
46. 154 A.D. at 672-73, 139 N.Y.S. at 371. Compare with Justice O'Brien's similar statehttps://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss2/3
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Thomas' apparent willingness to rely on abstractions from the law
of carriers thereby becomes all the more significant. Unlike Holmes,
the Irish judges, and the Allaire majority, he was fully prepared to
recognize the existence of a general tort duty to the unborn, so long as
a relation existed giving rise to a duty. The association and development of these two obviously inimical positions is striking. The confidence with which Thomas reaches his result, therefore, can best be explained by his faith in the methodology that he employed. Despite a
similarity in the approaches of the Irish judges and Thomas, there was
a subtle difference. The former perceived themselves as applying specifics from the law of common carriers; when they used the term duty, it
concerned the special duty derived from the carrier relationship. With
Thomas, the idea itself of duty had grown into an independent calculus,
whose application not only determined but also justified the outcome of
the case. Even the Irish judges, had they been able overcome the primal determinant which confounded them like a boulder in a narrow
path, gave indications of a willingness to attempt an accommodation.
Justice Thomas intimated that it was not enough that reasons against
recovery be exploded; a reason for recovery must be found.
Streetcars that came to jerky stops and lurched ahead before expectant mothers had the opportunity to disembark safely appear to
have posed a major threat to prenatal life during this whole period. In
another streetcar case, a few years later in 1916, Lipps v. Milwaukee
Electric Railway Co.,47 the woman was five months pregnant at the
time of the accident "before [the child] could have been born viable."4
In due time the child was born, with physical defects traceable to the
accident. Proceeding along the lines foreshadowed by the WindesBoggs approach, the court held that because the child at the time of
the accident could not have been born "viable," and since a "nonviable" child cannot exist apart from its mother, the child was, therefore, part of its mother and not a person. 4' That ended the question of
liability. It was a perfect syllogism. The court went on, however, to
suggest that "very cogent reasons" existed for a contrary rule when the
child was "viable" at the time of the accident. Following the Allaire
dissent, the court implied that two infants sustaining similar injuries

ment in Walker:
I would not myself see any injustice in the abstract in such an action being held to lie, or in
the risks of a carrier being extended to the necessary incidents of nature.
28 L.R.lr. at 81.
47. 164 Wis. 272, 159 N.W. 916 (1916).
48. Id.
49. The court said: "Its [the child's] rights are merged in those of the mother of whom it
forms a part." 164 Wis. at 272, 159 N.W. at 917; see footnote 9 and accompanying text supra.
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from the same negligent act should be treated differently. One should
be denied compensation because he was a few months younger than the
other, because, at the time of the injuries, one had crossed the invisible
viability line and the other had not. Yet, the Lipps court affirmed that
it would have decided the Nugent case for the plaintiff, since the pregnancy there was well advanced, though it found no force at all in the
arguments by way of analogy from other fields of law which had influenced Judge Thomas to discard the pars matris proposition. The Lipps
case provided firm evidence that the magic dividing line of viability,
whether artificial or not, was coming to be recognized as meaningful,
by lawyers at least.50
IX.

DROBNER V. PETERS: THE JUDICIARY BECOMES THE
LEGISLATURE

Sooner or later a case would come along where the duty emanated
not from the relation of carrier to passenger or from any other special
relation. This. would be a case in which, if there was a duty at all, the
factual situation would sound in general negligence, pure and simple.

50. It was not so clear, however, whether viability was a medical or legal concept, for the
court ended on a hopelessly muddled note:
Neither does the medical or scientific recognition of the separate entity of an unborn child
aid in determining its legal rights. The law cannot always be scientific or technically correct. It must often content itself with being merely practical.
164 Wis. at 272, 159 N.W. at 917.
What is curious about this statement is that presumably the Lipps court had adopted the viability
concept, as Windes and Boggs had done twenty years before, for the very reason that it was based
on "correct" scientific and technical positions. Now the court said that medicine and science were
of no help and seemed to imply that medicine and science recognized the unborn as a separate
entity prior to its "viability."
The apparent inconsistency is explained, however, if one looks at it as the consequence of a reversal in momentum in the role of the viability concept in the directed development of a rule of law.
In Allaire, Windes and Boggs had fashioned the viability concept as a simple means of allowing
an initial limited liability where none at all had previously existed. For them, viability was a
beginning. The Lipps court redefines viability as a limitation on liability. It grants that "very
cogent reasons" exist for allowing recovery for "post-viability" prenatal injuries, though interestingly it does not specify these reasons; but it draws the line at viability. For Lipps, viability is an
ending, a purely legal device to limit liability. A correspondence to medical and scientific knowledge, implicit in the Windes-Boggs formulation of viability, has become an incidental feature of
the redefined viability of Lipps. Accordingly, it is a feature which must give way to the perceived
necessity of the law to be "practical."
As a dialectical device, compare the Lipps statement with the ingenuous sounding words of Justice
Blackmun in Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 159 (1973), where he says,
We need not resolve the difficult question of when life begins. When those trained in the
respective disciplines of medicine, philosophy, and theology are unable to arrive at any
consensus, the judiciary, at this point in the development of man's knowledge, is not in a
position to speculate as to the answer.
and then, in spite of which, he goes on a few pages later to do exactly that, to resolve the question
of when life begins, when with .an assured dogmatism he effectually notches the beginning of life
at the onset of the second trimester by judicial fiat.
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Such a case would provide a test for Judge Thomas' rejection of the
pars matris proposition and would give some indication of the extent to
which the Windes-Boggs viability-based compromise, applauded in
Lipps, was taking hold. That case arrived in 1920-1921 in Drobner v.
Peters81 which, because of the prestige and influence of the New York
Court of Appeals, was to have a settling effect on the status of the
prenatal rule for the next few decades.
A pregnant woman was walking along a sidewalk in New York.
Her pregnancy was well advanced, over eight months. She fell into a
coal hole the iron doors of which had negligently been left open. Eleven
days later she gave birth. Later her child, through a guardian, sued for
prenatal injuries. The case was unlike Walker, Nugent, or Lipps because the duty could not derive from a carrier-passenger undertaking,
or from a similar contractual undertaking such as the Allaire relation
of hospital to patient. Viability, for what it was worth, was a given. So
if there was a duty here, it came from the general relationship which
circumscribes the tort of negligence.
Initially, in the supreme court, Judge Ford Closely followed
Thomas' Nugent reasoning in denying defendant's demurrer. Plaintiff
accordingly was not pars matris. The decision in Nugent was distinguishable, Ford said, adopting Thomas' line of thought again,-because
it was based on the fact that the mother was a passenger, the railroad
had had no knowledge of the plaintiff being aboard, and hence had not
contracted for his passage.
And then Ford says:
It seems to me that the harsh rule there applied should not be extended,
but rather confined strictly to the limits set in that case.5
This is a surprising statement, and it marks an important point in the
evolution of the prenatal duty rule. If the law of negligence excused
from liability the carrier, which historically had been under the obligation of exercising the highest degree of care for its passengers, then a
fortiori it excused those who had no relationship whatsoever with the
injured. To talk of extending the harsh rule from carriers to non-relational situations exemplified by the coal hole affair was an inversion of
language. The rule as it stood could be extended no more, because no
relationship existed which demanded a greater degree of care than that
of the carrier. One might speak of retracting the rule from this extended position; one might even speak of abolishing the rule entirely.
51. 184 N.Y.S. 337 (1920), affd., 194 A.D. 696, 186 N.Y.S. 278 (1921), rev'd, 232 N.Y.
220, 133 N.E. 567 (1921).
52. 184 N.Y.S. at 338.
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But, the rule could not be extended backwards. Logically, if the rule
applied to carriers, who were under the obligation to exercise the greatest degree of care for the passengers, it already comprehended the coal
hole facts, if not by actual decision then by force of reason. If the carrier is not liable when negligently inflicted prenatal injury occurs to the
fetus of one of its own passengers, then obviously the same carrier can
be no more liable when its streetcar negligently collides with a bus, and
this collision results in prenatal injury to the fetus of a passenger on the
bus.
Judge Ford unconsciously accomplished an admirable reversal of
symmetry. Such reversals are a chief means by which the system itself,
with the imagination of a judge acting as catalyst, disposes of a bad
rule. It does so by doing the impossible: turning an integrated, idealogically extended whole into a part, reducing it by reversing it. In the
reversal of symmetry the end is pushed back to the beginning, and the
former rule, what is left of it, now an anomaly, slowly withers. The
process exemplifies the old truth that the universe disposes of its own
evil. So too with the law perhaps.
The immediate consequence of the reversal of symmetry is the isolation of an unpleasant rule of law. An equally important though less
immediately noticeable consequence is that a new principle begins to
emerge, a purer liquor, a closer approximation to the truth. In time, it
extends over the field formerly governed by implication by the now limited rule. Outwardly, Judge Ford's opinion says, evincing the humanism that has frequently been found in the development of the prenatal
duty,5 a that the no-duty rule should be limited to the facts of the Nugent case, that is, to situations where the common carrier carries the
mother and is unaware of her pregnant state. Inwardly, the opinion
says something else. It suggests that there.is a more fundamental principle at work which, properly understood, governs all cases, whether
they involve common carriers, contracts, other various relations, or no
relations at all. Could the more fundamental principle be uncovered
and stated in words? Could Drobner find what Nugent affirmed to be
non-existent? Judge Ford's reversal of symmetry posed a dilemma that,
one way or the other, had to be faced.
In a 3-2 decision, the Appellate Division affirmed Judge Ford."

53. It is our boast that the common law is elastic enough to fit itself to new conditions
and to progress pari passu with advancing civilization and our ever-growing humanitarianism; and it is but a manifestation of this spirit of the law to recognize responsibility of the
defendant to this child, now doomed to go through life permanently injured in head, body,
and limbs.
Id. Cf. Remarks of Justice Windes in Allaire; see also, notes 33-34 and acoompanying text supra.
54. 194 A.D. 696, 186 N.Y.S. 278 (1921).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss2/3
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The majority rejected the pars matris proposition for the same reasons
that had led Judge Thomas to do the same: analogies from criminal
law and the rights of inheritance. In effect, Judge Merrell, writing for
the majority, seemed to be accepting Ford's holding which limited Nugent to carrier cases. n
Judge Clarke, writing for the dissenters, granted that Merrell's
opinion was "persuasive" and his views "humanitarian," but he insisted
that legislation was necessary." While Judge Merrell had missed the
implications of the dilemma posed by Judge Ford, Clarke jumped on
them, as his dissection of the argument against "extending" Nugent
shows. He could see no distinction between the obligation of a carrier
and the obligation of an owner of property which abutted the street. If
there was a breached duty in the present case, evidenced by the negligent maintenance of the coal hole into which the pregnant woman had
fallen, there was also a breached duty in the Nugent case. His logic
was unanswerable. Judge Ford had simply atomized the ensuing problem by a reversal of symmetry; Judge Merrell had sloughed awkwardly
over it. Finally, in response to Merrell's comments on the absence of
precedent, Judge Clarke agreed that the common law was flexible,
adapting to life's changing conditions. The law of stagecoaches extended, with necessary changes, to railroads. The common law accommodated, by a like extension of principles, the automobile, the telephone, and the telegraph. These were all new conditions which the
common law in its flexibility and progressiveness found no difficulty in
recognizing.
But the carriage of children en ventre sa mere is no new condition. It is
as old as humanity itself, and to apply to that venerable and immutable
fact the doctrine of adaptability to changed conditions does not appear to
57
me to be logical.

55. The court rejected the argument that, in the absence of precedent, legislative intervention was necessary to secure redress:
Most of the common law of negligence . . . is of comparatively recent origin. Acts which
today . . . are held to constitute actionable negiglence, a hundred years ago would have
received no serious consideration by courts of justice. If it be said that the common law
furnishes no precedent for such an action ... , it may also be said with equal force that by
no principle of common law is such right of action denied.
194 A.D. at 703, 186 N.Y.S. at 283. It was a simple, pure, and dialectically correct response to
the prior judicial adherence to the primal determinant. To Holmes' purported reluctance to strike
out into what he characterized as "an unexplored field of litigation," see note 4 and accompanying
text supra, to O'Brien's admonition not to venture beyond the "landmark of precedent", see note
26 supra, Judge Merrell in Drobner replied by using language as an agent to dissolve the primal
determinant. This was real "creative boldness", see note 25 supra.
56. 194 A.D. at 708-11, 186 N.Y.S. at 287-88 (dissenting opinion).
57. byId.
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And there it was, a recurrence of O'Brien's crusty metaphoric dictum
of thirty years before. The carriage of passengers on a train or a streetcar or in an automobile: these were new conditions. But, as for the
carriage of unborn children by their mothers, that went back to the
beginning of time and, therefore, by definition, was not a new condition. The syllogism was convenient circularity, overlooking that Merrell
had not justified the prenatal duty of care as an instance of the adaptability of the common law to changed conditions." Merrell knew as well
as Clarke that pregnancy was nothing new. Merrell merely thought
that the absence of precedent was not determinative one way or the
other, and he buttressed this assertion by emphasizing that, in the
course of the last century, the law of negligence had extended to many
factual situations not formerly comprehended by the law and, needless
to say, not supported by the existence of any precedent one way or the
other. His point was not that any extension of the law of negligence
must occur under the guise of the doctrine of adaptability of the common law to changed conditions. The two matters were wholly distinct.
Clarke accordingly misconstrued Merrell's position on that point, so
greatly did the zeitgeist notion of woman influence his thinking.
By the time that Drobner v. Peters reached the Court of Appeals
in 1921, the conceptual development of the prenatal duty rule was coming to a head. The evolution of the rule so far pointed to an imminent
judicial climax. By any measure, however, the 6-1 decision reversing
the lower courts and holding that there was no duty was less than climactic. It was disappointing, not for its contrary holding, but for its
failure to grapple with the questions that previous judges had faced
head-on. Cardozo dissented, unfortunately without opinion.5

58. Beyond that, nevertheless, it is a matter of some interest that Clarke should connect the
changed conditions doctrine, even as a straw man, with the prenatal duty of care. It was more
than a straw man, for its use amounted almost to an evasion. The perception of industry and
commerce and matters sexual in equivalent terms was of course a conspicuous feature of the
industrial revolution and its accompanying mindset. See also note 45 supra (unborn must "earn"
a duty of care). That perception parallels O'Brien's outrageous metaphor in Walker that women
are common carriers. Clarke's reasoning is unabashedly circular, however, in that it makes as
good sense in any case in which precedents are lacking to provide guidance. Even railroads and
automobiles would not exemplify new conditions becauie, after all, the carriage of passengers in
vehicles is no new condition. Nor is the transmission of messages a new condition. It would follow
that the judiciary would be equally powerless to fashion remedies in cases involving railroads and
automobiles as in the case of prenatal injuries. But that is just the difference, Clarke would remind us: a remedy already existed for a passenger injured on a stagecoach or chariot; no remedy
existed for an unborn child, because, as he puts it, "through all the centuries of the common law
no such action has been sustained." 194 A.D. at 711, 186 N.Y.S. at 288. In this way, Clarke
brings us full circle back to his real starting point: it cannot be done now because it has never
been done before: the primal determinant. The doctrine of the adaptability of the common law to
changed conditions is, upon analysis, not central to Clarke's thinking.
59. Is there any ground for hazarding a conjecture as to the probable basis of Cardozo's
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss2/3
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First, Justice Pound rejected the proposition, advanced by Judge
Thomas in Nugent and followed by Judge Merrell, that the criminal
law and the law of inheritance provided by analogy authority for the
existence of the unborn as a legally cognizable entity. "When justice or
convenience requires," Pound said, the unborn might be treated as if it
were a human being.60 But whatever the area of law concerned, it was
a mere fiction that treated an unborn child as if he were alive. It was
plain, therefore, that when "justice or convenience" did not so require,
the contrary treatment was inevitable. The essential problem, then,
from Pound's point of view, was to determine whether or not justice or
convenience required the recognition of a prenatal duty of care.
Pound explains that it could no longer be rationally asserted that
the injury is to the mother alone. Look here, he says in effect, the child
stands before us with the injuries "he carried out into the world with
him." ' Apparently, then, Pound was a realist: he would not deny that

opinionless dissent? The question has obvious importance. The majority in Drobner brings the
prenantal rule full circle back to the Holmes position via the judicial legislation route. Coming as
it did from the most prestigious tort court in the United States, the decision effectually set back
the evolution of the prenatal duty of care by a time equal to that which had elapsed since Dietrich, because it was to take another thirty-five years to undo the Drobner damage. A Cardozo
dissent might have had the effect of largely negating the force of the majority opinion. It is known
that Cardozo generally preferred to integrate his legal thought within already existing legal structures. That circumstance provides good reason to believe that Cardozo may very well have accepted the Thomas-Merrell analogy, rejected by the majority, that since the unborn is considered
in existence for inheritance and criminal law purposes, he ought to be considered in existence for
tort purposes. It would have been a natural extension, if not one actually dictated by logic. The
general duty question, which had confounded Ford, Merrell, and Clarke in the lower courts would
have remained. Duty analysis was Cardozo's stock in trade; it is unlikely that he would have
sloughed over the duty problem, as Merrell had done in writing for the Appellate Division majority. Unlikely, too, that he would have missed the inconsistency in Ford's approach that Clarke had
pointed out. Cardozo might well have reasoned that there was a general duty of care owed to the
plaintiff, that it derived from negligence principles alone, and therefore applied equally in contractual and non-contractual settings, thus repudiating the holding of Nugent and freeing the prenatal
duty of care from the abstractions from the law of common carriers that had hindered its growth
since Walker in 1891. Even as a dissent such an opinion would have been a tour de force, and it
would have certainly guided and influenced future courts as Cardozo's stature grew. We have no
indications of whether Cardozo would have subscribed to the Windes-Boggs viability concept as a
limitation on liability. Neither Nugent nor the various Drobner opinions mention viability; in both
of these New York cases the injuries had been sustained about one month prior to the time for
normal birth. Consequently, even if he was attracted to it, there would have been no need to
superimpose the viability concept on the facts of Drobner.Any thoughts on viability would therefore have been dicta. On the other hand, viability, despite the implicit subordination of legal to
medical processes that it entailed, worked as an attractive compromise, and at least one court had
already adopted the Windes-Boggs idea. See notes 47-50 and accompanying text supra. A subsequent decision which was handed down a few years later from a Pennsylvania county court may
well approximate the thinking behind Cardozo's opinionless dissent. Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D.
& C. 227 (1924). See notes 75-77 and acompanying text infra.
60. 232 N.Y. at 223, 133 N.E. at 568 (1921).
61. by
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which so obviously sat before him. The language seems to signal that
the approach dictated by "justice and convenience" will be refreshingly
realistic. In his next sentence, Pound reinforces the signal when he
points out that the modern judicial tendency is "to ignore fictions and
deal with things as they are." The unfolding of Pound's opinion up to
this point indicated that the court was on the verge of proclaiming the
demise of at least the pars matris proposition and perhaps the viability
compromise as well. Pound even goes so far as to affirm that "sympathy and natural justice point the way" to a cause of action for prenatal
injuries.
Then came the reversal. "The injuries, when inflicted, were injuries to the mother." There was no duty of care to the unborn child; the
duty was to the mother. This is pars matris, vintage 1884. Yet, what
makes it astonishing is that Pound just finished telling us that, to use
his own words, "no longer may it be urged that the mother alone is
injured." Moreover, he told us that the modern tendency is to ignore
fictions and deal with things "as they are." To deal with things as they
are would seem to require emptying the pars matris proposition of the
fictitious myth, which the presence of the injured child so clearly refutes, and to deal with the injury as an independent existential.
Pound acknowledges that strong reasons of public policy may be
urged on either side of the question. The reasons favoring the prenatal
duty, whatever they are, apparently do not rise to the acceptable level
of requirements of justice and convenience, in which concept sympathy
and natural justice are evidently not active ingredients:
The conditions of negligence law at the present time do not suggest that
the reasons in favor of recovery so far outweigh those which may be
advanced against it as to call for judicial legislation.1
The assertion has implications. Many of the earlier courts that denied
recovery mentioned that the establishment of a prenatal duty was a
matter for the legislature. Ostensibly, they doubted their own power to
rule for the plaintiff. If we place in contradistinction to such-positions
Pound's remark about judicial legislation, we find a break of some consequence. Unlike his predecessors, Justice Pound did not doubt in the
slightest the power of the court to establish the duty of care argued for,
but he called that power exactly what he perceived it to be: judicial
legislation. In its orientation it was a fundamentally different power
than the power that previous courts had had in mind when it was girgued that they should hold in favor of a prenatal duty. For instance,
though their critics might have said that Judges Ford, Merrell, Windes,
62. Id. at 224, 133 N.E. at 568 (1921).
https://ecommons.udayton.edu/udlr/vol7/iss2/3
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and Justice Boggs were delving into matters properly reserved to the
legislature, these judges perceived themselves to be building upwards
from below, extending rules of law by conventional judicial processes,
hardly attempting to legislate. Pound's "judicial legislation," on the
other hand, makes no pretense of building upwards from below; it
ordains from above in much the same way as the legislative branch.
Judicial legislation is thus a kind of fiat lux. It naturally followed that
judges must engage in the same kind of thinking that legislators engaged in.68 The cognitive unitarianism that had previously characterized the judicial process, as seen for example in Thomas' Nugent opinion, in the Drobner opinions by Ford, Merrell, and Clarke, and in the
development of the Windes-Boggs viability concept, would be replaced
by the policy judgment, the product of that finely tuned, delicate mechanism over which the judges stood guard like an elect priesthood, and
which enabled them to "balance" or "weigh" various considerations denominated as "equities," "factors," or "interests."
Judicial legislation was a legislative rather than a judicial process.
In the consideration by the court of the various reasons for and against
a proposed rule of law no single reason could be controlling because, by
definition, there was no one determinative reason. It would be pointless,
therefore, to regret the absence of analysis in Justice Pound's statement
that the defendant owed the unborn no duty of care. Dialectically, it
was a conclusion without premises.
If Pound had attempted to carry out a duty analysis, in its most
preliminary stages, he must have realized the inconsistencies in his own
position: first recognizing a separate injury, then denying it; first affirming that the law should deal with reality and not with fictions, then
resolving the case by the pars matris proposition in its classic form.
Positive statements from Pound were rhetorical and inert. What epitomizes this jurisprudence of judicial legislation is its capacity for duality. It is rich in contradictions.
Pound tells us that the "reasons" against recovery were:
(1) lack of authority;
(2) practical inconvenience and possible injustice;
63. Real, legislative legislators are shrewd enought to intuit a circumstance the significance
of which is probably missed by judicial legislators: when you don't legislate, you legislate.
The idea of judicial legislation for some reason connotes progress and enlightenment, and this
in turn suggests a new willingness to fashion remedies for those who have been negligently injured.
Yet the consequence in Drobner was to make it even more difficult for the negligently injured to
prevail than it was under the former conceptualistic jurisprudence which was slowly heading in his
direction. Concealed in the guise of judicial legislation is an uncompromising oracular pronouncement that harks back to Holmes' lawgiving in Dietrich. The enjoyment of unbounded judicial
power goes hand in hand with a robot-like adherence to precedent; and no contradiction is noticed
in the association.
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(3) no separate entity apart from mother, and therefore no duty of care;
and
(4) no person or human being in esse at the time of the accident."
The third and fourth reasons are differently worded formulations of the
pars matris proposition. What is meant by the second reason is difficult
to know with certainty. Later courts assumed that this reason concerned the problem of proof.65 The first reason is clear, the primal determinant. Plaintiff's "reasons," assuming that they were something
other than negatives of the above, do not appear, but the conclusion of
the court makes plain that whatever plaintiff's reasons were, they did
not outweigh the reasons against recovery, listed above.
Not only must the reasons favoring recovery outweigh those
against, Pound intimates that they must do so by some definite incremental quantum in order to justify the intercession of judicial legislation. If we treat plaintiff's task as a hypothetical appellate burden of
confutation, he must do more than prevail by a simple preponderance
of the variously weighted reasons. He must win his argument by a margin that suggests the implementation of a clear and convincing measure
of persuasion. The weight of his reasons must be such as to induce a
firm belief and conviction by the judges that his position comports with
"justice and convenience."
An unusual appellate burden thus rested on the plaintiff in
Drobner. Defendant, on the other hand, could sit back comfortably, enjoying a measure of protection afforded by what amounted to, practically speaking, a presumption against the unprecedented cause of action. Holmes had imposed the same kind of burden on plaintiff in the
Dietrich case in 1884; now Pound revitalized the appellate burden obstacle by skillfully working it into the judicial weighing process." The

64. 232 N.Y. at 222, 133 N.E. at 567 (1921).
65. Kine v. Zuckerman, 4 Pa. D. & C. 227, 229 (1924). ("The second reason for denying
the right of recovery - the practical inconvenience and possible injustice - seems to us to be beside
the point. Are we to deny a remedy for the invasion of a right merely because possible fraud or
perjury might be committed in a particular case, and thus confess the inability of our judicial
machinery to ascertain the truth in the trial of issues of fact? If the right exists, the rules of
evidence are adequate to require satisfactory proof."); Montreal Tramways v. Leveille, 4 D.L.R.
337, 345 (1933) ("The other matter to which we are asked to give serious consideration was the
practical inconvenience and possible injustice to which the company might be exposed if it could
be maintained. . . . I feel quite confident that the rules of evidence are adequate to require satisfactory proof of responsibility and that the determination of the relation of cause and effect will
not involve the Court in any greater difficulty than now exists in many of our cases.").
This second reason against recovery should not be confused with the similarly worded "justice
and convenience" requirement which determines, in Pound's analysis, when the unborn is to be
accorded the rights of a human being. See note 60 and accompanying text supra.
66. See note 4 supra.
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primal determinant had new clothes."'
Drobner v. Peters brings to an end a particular phase of development characterized by not one directed progression, but by the progression of many smaller movements in combination, sometimes interrelated and interacting, sometimes not. The halt in ordered development
was caused by the apparent re-orientation in judicial approach that
Drobnerv. Peters signals. Seemingly, prenatal duty was on the verge of
a breakthrough which was prevented only by the intrusion of a wholly
new explanation of the judicial role in the establishment of duties of
care. Under the surface, as the lower Drobner opinions illustrate, the
evolutionary process had weakened dialectical support for the no-duty
position to the point of crumbling. But it is at just this point that a new
jurisprudence-in the form of judicial legislation--comes to the rescue
of the no-duty rule and suppresses the slow development of the past
thirty-seven years. An illiberal position is acceptable if reached by a
route that is viewed as progressive.
X.

THE POST-DROBNER PERIOD

Yet if one views Drobner v. Peters not as a suppression of the
evolving rule but rather as a necessary step in the evolutionary process,
then the actual decision of the case becomes unimportant. It is true
that the intrusion of the judicial legislation approach facilitated in 1921
an easy denial of the prenatal duty, a denial that was disappointing
because of the deficient analysis and the equivocality found in the.
Drobner decision. Moreover, from 1921 up to the time of Bonbrest v.
Kotz in 1946, it might have been said that Drobner, coming as it did
from the prestigious New York Court of Appeals, had resolved the prenatal duty question. But the greater significance of Drobner v. Peters

67. Pound's formulation of the judicial function has an interesting jurisprudential impact. It
creates a gap in the field of judicial reasoning just below the threshold of what has been called
judicial legislation. Picture a plaintiff who says: "But I'm not asking you to engage in judicial
legislation. I admit that I cannot marshal reasons in favor of my position that outweigh those
against it. Don't judicially legislate; just decide the case on the law." Under the terms of the
formulation that Pound presents, and it is a formulation that has carried the day in tort jurisprudence for the last several decades, such a response makes no sense - it is a contradiction in terms.
Yet, for the sake of demonstrating a point, if we impose on Pound to do what plaintiff asks, what
will he in fact do? The answer is that he will resort to the primal determinant. He will rule that
there is no precedent, that it has never been done before. For him the primal determinant would
settle the matter. What deserves emphasis is that in the jurisprudence in which judges aspire to be
legislators, in their wisdom balancing equities, weighing factors, making policy judgments - sometimes with admirable results - there is a void that stretches all the way from the deadest adherence to stale precedent (or lack of precedent) to the threshold of judicial legislation. Whatever lay
formerly in that area has been erased, forgotten. Twentieth century judges have forgotten this
land that lies between. It is fertile, and it is the task of a responsible jurisprudence to remember it,
to find it again.
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was the very intrusion of the juridical approach which, in relation to
the preceding development of the prenatal duty rule, seemed to be a
step backward. The cases that had preceded Drobner,and in particular
the lower Drobner opinions, had demonstrated that the legal entropy of
the inchoate rule had effectually been exhausted. The pars matris proposition had run its course. The viability concept, product of an unprincipled union of law and humanism, was still ambulatory, but it would
totter under the weight of criticism, even humanistically based criticism. Integration of the no-duty dogma into the law of common carriers had brought considerable vitality to the negative position, but by
the time of the Drobner case, as the analysis of Judges Ford and
Clarke about "extending" Nugent indicated, conceptual assistance
from the law of carriers was deteriorating. If Justice Pound's opinion in
Drobner seems irresolute and equivocal, that circumstance itself is suggestive. He was irresolute and equivocal because the arguments had
been exhausted. Analytically, there was no place for Pound to go.
If a process of weighing competing reasons, here in the guise of
the judicial legislation concept, is a necessary step in the evolution of a
rule of law, then the Drobner decision could only be right, not because
it denied liability, but because it took the crucial step. Judicial legislation would galvanize the evolutionary process by shifting development
of the rule to a different plane, characterized by insight rather than
conceptualism. After Drobner, courts considering the prenatal duty
question would have two choices and only two choices. Weaker courts
.would revert to the primal determinant. Stronger courts would engage
in the weighing process. Some of these latter courts would necessarily
find a duty, for the simple reason that the use of the weighing process,
in and of itself, was a clear sign of the absence of accord. After rejecting the reasons offered against a duty, one of these courts might see
things as they were by uncovering and stating the one, all-important
reason for a duty.
The post-Drobner period is characterized by the dichotomy suggested. The cases divide into two types. First, there were the recrudescent Dietrichs.As one would expect, these opinions were short and contained no analysis. These weaker courts summarily denied liability.
They gave as their reasons, variously, the pars matris proposition,"8 the
70
unwisdom of judicial legislation, 9 or the necessity for real legislation.

68. Stanford v. St. Louis-San Francisco Ry. Co., 14 Ala. 611, 108 So. 566 (1926); Ryan v.
Pub. Serv. Co-Ordinated Transport, 18 N.J. Misc. 429, 14 A.2d 52 (1940); Berlin v. J.C. Penney
Co., 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940).
69. 18 N.J. Misc. 429, 14 A.2d 52; Newman v. City of Detroit, 281 Mich. 60, 274 N.W.
710 (1937).
70. Berlin v. J.C. Penney, 339 Pa. 547, 16 A.2d 28 (1940).
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Following Pound's minor lead, they reverted to the primal determinant.
A second group of cases came from stronger courts. Following
Pound's major lead, they engaged in the weighing process. A Texas
decision in 1935, Magnolia Coca-Cola Bottling Co. v. Jordan,7' reviewed most of the cases in the prenatal duty cycle and purported to set
out and weigh the reasons in favor of recovery. This attempt was an
advancement beyond Drobner, because the weighing process of the latter case had considered, in its language at least, only reasons against
recovery. One of the reasons advanced in favor of recovery in Jordan
was the' legal serviceability of the viability concept, which Windes and
Boggs had devised thirty-five years before. In finding the viability compromise lacking weight, and denying liability, the Texas court managed
an interesting though not unpredictable reversal of direction for the
Windes-Boggs creation:
But how is the exact time for this change of status of being to be determined? There is no suddenly acquired new mode of existence during the
course of development. .

.

. The partition between life and death is thin

even after birth. How can even the most expert mark a line between the
viability and the nonviability of an unborn child? 72

The eventful dividing line simply was not there. The selective application of unprincipled humanism may bring desirable results, but results
that are always precarious. Straw men look whichever way they are
pointed.
Yet, during the post-Drobnerperiod, from 1921 to 1946, the year
in which Bonbrest v. Kotz started the "spectacular and abrupt reversal" of the no-duty rule, a few courts in the legal hinterlands were
holding that a prenatal duty did exist. In 1933 a Canadian case, Mon71. 124 Tex. 347, 78 S.W.2d 944 (Comm'n of Appeals 1935), rev'g, 47 S.W.2d 901 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1932).
72. Id. at 358-59, 78 S.W.2d at 949. The search never ends for an eventful dividing line,
somewhere between conception and birth, to serve as the point of origin of rights. Medical knowledge has progressed to the point where the viability concept has been recognized as unsatisfactory
and, consequently, has been largely abandoned as a line-drawing mechanism. See notes 40-42 and
accompanying, text supra. When old tools no longer work, new tools must be found. See e.g.,
Charles E. Kolb, "Proposed Human Life Statute: Abortion As Murder?" 67 A.B.A.J. 1122
(1981), where the author reasons:
(1) there exists somewhere between conception and birth a "point of psychophysical unity" at
which point "personhood" is attained [perhaps "earned" would be a better verb: see note 45,
supra];
(2) but it is "difficult" to locate this "point of psychophysical unity" ("[T]here probably never
will be a definite answer..." Id. at 1125);
(3) and due process rights should not be accorded to those unborn who have not crossed the line
of "psychophysical unity."
Underneath the words, the argument is the same that the Texas court used in 1935 to deny a
cause of action for a negligently inflicted prenatal injury. It is equally circular.
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treal Tramways v. Leveille, 3 considered the reasons against recovery
that Pound had enumerated in Drobner and found them wanting.
Largely on the authority of the civil code, it rejected the pars matris
proposition. It handled the lack of authority argument with the observation that modern science appeared to be facilitating what was formerly an insuperable burden of proof. Pound's other reason, "practical
inconvenience and possible injustice," was similarly given short shrift:
the rules of evidence were up to the task of requiring proof of the elements of a claim. The argument that the liability of the railway should
be determined in relation to the mother's ticket was likewise brushed
aside. In disposing of an argument that had confounded earlier courts,
the Canadian court said that contract was irrelevant; plaintiff was suing not because defendant had breached its contract with his mother,
74
but because it had committed an independent tort against him. Leveille thus rejected all of the reasons Drobner had given against recovery. The one thing lacking was a positive assertion of the reason for
recovery-one reason whose singleness and unity would demonstrate it
to be an axiom, not an argument. The principle, whatever it was,
needed elucidation.
Elucidation, as an event, had already taken place. In 1924, a
Pennsylvania county court had engaged in the Drobner weighing process and, like Leveille, found a duty. Judge Gordon's opinion in Kine v.
Zuckerman75 sparkles; it might have been Cardozo's dissent in
Drobner. Unlike the court in Leveille, Judge Gordon's opinion adumbrated a principle, the significance of which we have difficulty fully
appreciating today for the very reason that, ironically, since we have
already assimilated the principle, it does not astonish us. It would have
astonished Holmes in Dietrich, or the Irish judges in Walker, or certainly Justice Thomas in Nugent. It is the literal apotheosis of Justice
Pound's resolution to "deal with things as they are" :76
[T]he injury which accompanied [the child] into the world it suffers
now, when it has become a being capable of receiving injury ...
Conceding the non-existence of the child before birth, we are forced to
the conclusion that the natural consequence of the defendant's alleged

73. 4 D.L.R. 337 (1933).
74. Two other cases found for plaintiffs during this period, though they did so largely on the
basis of civil statutes. Scott v. McPheeters, 33 Cal. App. 2d 629, 92 P.2d 678 (1939), affd per
curiam, 93 P.2d 562 (1939); Cooper v. Blanck, 39 So. 2d 352 (La. App. 1923). The second of
these, interestingly, remained unpublished until 1949, well after Bonbrest v. Kotz had initiated the
abrupt reversal of the well settled rule of no liability. The facts in Cooper, in which a negligently
maintained ceiling fell on a pregnant tenant, were identical to these in an earlier, otherwise unremarkable case, Gorman v. Budlong, 23 R.I. 169, 49 A. 704 (1901).
75. 4 Pa. D. & C. 227 (1924).
76. See text accompanying note 63 supra.
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negligence was the deprivation to the existing child of

....

a fully

equipped body. This is the injury which the infant plaintiff is now
suffering. ....

.7

The "nowness" of the injury was the existential which the law had
finally comprehended. Judge Gordon's statement is a positive enunciation of the realization which is at the core of the prenatal duty rule.
Philosophical questions about when life began were better left to philosophers. The injury was now.7 It was the final determinant. Man's
expanding consciousness had discerned the injury.
XI.

CONCLUSION

Analysis by inherent determinants is a method of setting out and
investigating the critical points in the development of a rule of law.
The evolution of the prenatal duty rule occurred in two distinct
stages. First was the period from 1884, when Holmes forcefully laid
down the primal determinant, to 1921. During this period judges
tended to fall back on innate prejudice and myth, in particular the pars
matris proposition, in repeatedly denying recovery for prenatal injuries.
The law of common carriers was probably the single most effective
mechanism which perpetuated the no-duty rule because abstractions
from that branch of the law jelled conveniently with the pars matris
proposition. Yet, concern at a human level was plain, as shown by the
words of sympathy for the injured and the frequently expressed wish
77. 4 Pa. D. & C. at 230-31. Compare Judge Gordon's elucidation of the prenatal duty rule
and Justice McGuire's elaboration of the same (Note 78, infra) with Justice Flaherty's concurring
opinion in Speck v. Finegold, - Pa. _ 439 A.2d 110, 115 (1981) (equally divided court affirms
that child afflicted with hereditary disease does not have "wrongful life" action against negligent
physicians):
"The view that we cannot calculate the value of existence as compared to nonexistence is
only one such hyper-scholastic rationale used to deny a cause of action in these cases.
Those holding such views are apparently able to overlook what is plain to see: that-in
cases such as this-a diseased plaintiff exists and, taking the allegations of the complaint
as true, would not exist at all but for the negligence of the defendants." (Emphasis
supplied).
78. Justice McGuire, who wrote the opinion in Bonbrest v. Kotz, likewise thought it important to emphasize the injury as an independent existential: "Here, however, we have a viable child
- one capable of living outside the womb - and which has demonstrated its capacity to survive by
surviving - are we to say now it has no locus standi in court or elsewhere?" 65 F. Supp. at 140
(emphasis in original). And, "It has, if viable, its own bodily form and members, manifests all of
the anatomical characteristics of individuality, possesses its own circulatory, vascular and excretory systems and is capable now of being ushered into the visible world." 65 F. Supp. at 141
(emphasis in the original).
Aside from the momentous insight into the existential nowness of the injury, the argument
was a demonstrably circular. The neonate had demonstrated its capacity to survive by surviving.
(see note 35 supra). But it was also an answer to the illusory viability compromise which Justice
Windes had created a half century earlier and which even today, in other sectors of the law,
continues to exercise a strange influence over the minds of men and judges.
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for legislative action. The viability compromise was a humanistically
based attempt to maintain the no-duty rule and, at the same time, to
lessen its statistical harshness. What went on during this stage of evolution was a conceptualistic exploration which gradually exhausted the
legal entropy of the no-duty position. The culmination came in Drobner
v. Peters, in which Justice Pound stressed the importance of dealing
with things "as they are," but was unable to make the law comprehend
the existential "nowness" of the injury.
The second stage of evolution was the period from 1921 to 1946.
Courts either peremptorily reverted to the primal determinant or
weighed reasons and voted accordingly. The use of the weighing process, however, eventually leads to acceptance of the emerging rule. This
is so because, in a literal sense, in tort law there are no categorical
reasons against allowing recovery for a negligently inflicted injury.
There is only the injury and plenty of time for human perception and
awareness to grow to the point of recognizing and verbalizing the one
axiomatic reason for recovery. In the end, it is the only reason that
counts.
The period after 1946 was the bandwagon era. The "spectacular
and abrupt reversal" had already occurred, not in the pages of law reports, but in the mind, in the capacity of judges not merely to be objectively aware of an injury, as every judge was from Holmes to Pound,
but to make room for it in the language of the law.
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